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POUND FOOLISH: CHALLENGING 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE 
U.S. AND THE U.K. 
“It’s good to be the king.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
stronomical executive pay has been referred to as “the 
most egregious governance failure of the 20th century.”2  
Although excessive executive remuneration has long been a 
newsworthy topic in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), beginning in 
the early and mid-1990s “interest in the topic reached unprece-
dented levels.”3  There were several reasons for this piqued in-
terest in the salaries of the country’s executives.  For one, the 
“gross pay of chief executives in larger U.K. public companies 
rose nearly 600% between 1979 and 1994.”4  In addition, “remu-
neration levels seemed to bear little relation to corporate per-
formance.”5  Finally, as corporations were increasing their ex-
ecutives’ pay, they were also cutting back on rank and file em-
ployee positions.6  Although executive pay was a hot topic in the 
United States (“U.S.”) throughout the 1990s, it didn’t reach its 
pinnacle until early 2001.7  This was mainly due to the thriving 
U.S. economy — investors and shareholders were “too optimis-
tic about their personal economic future to be very concerned 
about executives getting rich.”8  However, with the economic 
slowdown beginning in early 2001, and the recent corporate 
scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco, good corporate 
governance is now on the radar screen of most shareholders.9  
  
 1. History of the World Part I (Twentieth Century Fox 1981). 
 2. Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards, How the Corporate Scandals 
are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 7, 2002, at 108. 
 3. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a 
Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 277, 278 (2001).  For a general discussion, see id. at 278–82.  
 4. Id. at 279.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 298–99. 
 8. Id. at 279. 
 9. Id. at 299.  See also Jerry Useem, Have They No Shame?, FORTUNE, 
Apr. 28, 2003, at 59; Andrew Hill & Caroline Daniel, U.S. Investors Are Grow-
 
A 
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Essentially, within the realm of corporate governance topics, 
executive pay has preoccupied investors the most.  Indeed, in 
2003 “[e]xecutive pay ha[d] taken over as the top concern of cor-
porate governance from last year’s biggest worry, the independ-
ence of auditors.”10  “Yet although executive compensation was 
one of the first targets that critics of corporate America at-
tacked after the spate of scandals [in 2002], it is still proving 
the toughest to reform.”11 
This Note analyzes the issue of executive compensation 
through a comparison of the U.S. and the U.K., with a focus on 
the rights and responsibilities of shareholders in challenging 
executive pay.  Part II compares the U.S. and U.K. systems of 
corporate governance, including corporate structure, composi-
tion of share ownership and corporate governance laws in both 
countries.  Part III examines whether executive compensation 
is excessive.  Part IV discusses the details of setting compensa-
tion and the related disclosure regimes in the U.K. and the U.S.  
In particular, it examines the methods by which executives are 
paid and sets out the laws regulating the setting of compensa-
tion in both countries.  Part V addresses the issue of how 
shareholders can challenge executive compensation, with a fo-
cus on challenges through voting.  Specifically, this section dis-
cusses challenges by shareholder proposals, challenges to share 
option plans, and challenges at the annual meeting.  Part VI 
focuses on recent amendments to the U.K. Companies Act and 
to the New York Stock Exchange listing rules.  Finally, Part VII 
discusses shareholder responsibilities and stresses the need for 
greater shareholder involvement in the compensation process.   
II. COMPARING THE U.S. AND U.K. SYSTEMS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
There are many similarities between the corporate sectors of 
the U.S. and the U.K..  Both systems are “characterized by a 
relatively large number of quoted companies, a liquid capital 
market where ownership and control rights are traded fre-
  
ing Restive Over Lavish Boardroom Pay, But Will They Fall Quiet Once the 
Bear Market Recedes, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 9. 
 10. Fat Cats Feeding, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 64.  
 11. Hill & Daniel, supra note 9, at 9.  
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quently, and few inter-corporate holdings.”12  In other words, 
both systems have capital markets and wide dispersal of owner-
ship.13  Since dispersed ownership is found in both the U.S. and 
the U.K., “[t]he U.S. is…a particularly important country 
against which to compare U.K. governance because unlike Con-
tinental Europe and most of the rest of the world, the underly-
ing structure of its capital markets and companies is similar.”14 
A. Corporate Structure in the U.S. and U.K.  
At the outset, it is important to note some specific similarities 
between corporate structure in the U.S. and U.K.  Both the U.S. 
and the U.K. “have a ‘shareholder economy’ where private en-
terprise is about maximizing profits for those who invest.”15  As 
a result, “shareholders occupy the central position with respect 
to companies.”16  The system of ownership and control in both 
countries has been called an “outsider/arm’s-length” system.17  
“Outsider” refers to the fact that most firms do not have a “core” 
group of shareholders with “inside” influence, but rather have 
dispersed ownership “among a large number of institutional 
and individual investors rather than being concentrated in the 
hands of family owners, banks or affiliated firms.”18  The term 
“arm’s-length” is used to describe the fact that investors “are 
rarely poised to intervene and take a hand in running a busi-
ness.”19  Essentially, this role is left to the corporate executives.20 
Since the U.S. has a common law legal system and market-
based economy, the main form of corporation in the U.S. is the 
publicly-held company with widely-dispersed ownership.  This 
creates an agency problem between the shareholders, who own 
  
 12. G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 3 (1996). 
 13. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Governance as a Source of Manage-
rial Discipline, 2, Apr. 10, 2000 (prepared for the Company Law Review, 
Committee E on Corporate Governance), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ 
cld/franksreport.pdf.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 297.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 297–98. 
 18. Id.  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around 
the World, 54 J. OF FIN. 471 (1999). 
 19. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 298. 
 20. Id. 
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the company, and the executives and directors, who manage the 
company.21   
Each of the fifty U.S. states has its own business corporations 
law and each corporation is governed by the law of the state of 
its incorporation.22  Each corporation draws up articles of incor-
poration setting out the duties and rights of shareholders and 
directors.23  The shareholders, being owners of the corporation, 
are given certain rights, including the right to vote, such as vot-
ing for the board of directors.24  The board, in turn, chooses ex-
ecutives to run the day-to-day operations of the firm and set 
dividends.25  Often, in the U.S., the positions of chairman of the 
board of directors and chief executive officer are held by one 
person.26 
The U.K.’s corporate structure is similar to that of the U.S.  
At least part of the U.K.’s corporate governance system has 
been shaped by “its political and social history and attitudes.”27    
It has been suggested that the fact that the U.K. is an island 
has led to its “[i]nsularity” which “has bequeathed the U.K. a 
sense of welcome separateness which no amount of foreign en-
tanglement can destroy.”28   
The general model of corporate management and control in 
the U.K. involves “two main organs: the board of directors and 
the general meeting of members.”29  Pursuant to a company’s 
articles of association, the board may “appoint and confer any of 
their powers upon one or more executive (or ‘managing’) direc-
  
 21. See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from 
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542–43 (2000). 
 22. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 174 (1994). 
 23. See GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE COUNSEL 
14–15 (American Bar Association, 1996). 
 24. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Director’s Selec-
tion, §1.01, at 1–2 (The Michie Company, 1993) (“Most central to shareholders’ 
role then is their power to elect directors, and statutes typically refer to that 
shareholder power expressly.”).  See also CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 182. 
 25. See CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 183, 194–96. 
 26. Who’s in Charge?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2003, at 20.  
 27. CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 249.  See generally Roe, supra note 21. 
 28. CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 250.  
 29. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at  6. 
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tors, which in effect allows the creation of a third organ –—
executive management.”30   
Essentially, “the board of directors is the most important day-
to-day organ in the company.”31  The board of directors has “the 
power to manage the business of the company, and the general 
meeting is not permitted to interfere with its exercise.”32  How-
ever, this does not mean that the annual general meeting 
(“AGM”) (analogous to the “annual meeting” in the U.S.) is 
without purpose.  At the AGM, the shareholders may remove 
directors without cause by vote, which requires a simple major-
ity.33  In addition, shareholders may vote at the general meeting 
to alter the articles of association, which requires a three-
quarters super-majority.34  The board of a typical public com-
pany in the U.K. is comprised of both non-executive directors 
and executive directors.35  The board, as a whole, does not typi-
cally manage the day-to-day operations of the company; rather, 
the board delegates these duties to the chief executive (also 
called the “managing director”) and other executive directors.36  
Unlike in the U.S., the roles of chairman and chief executive are 
generally separated.37  The executive management of the com-
pany, which consists of executive directors and executive offi-
cers (who are not members of the board), plan the company’s 
  
 30. Id. 
 31. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 303 (Eng.).  
 34. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 9.  
 35. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7.  Although this is not a requirement 
under U.K. law, the Combined Code suggests that the board have an appro-
priate balance of executive and non-executive directors (including independ-
ent non-executives) so that no individual or group of individuals can dominate 
the board’s decision making. See Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, 
§ 1, paras. B1–B3, Schedules A, B (June 1998).  See also DEPARTMENT OF 
TRADE AND INDUSTRY  (“DTI”), CONSULTATION PAPER, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (June 7, 2002) [hereinafter 
Higgs Report]. 
 36. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7. 
 37. Who’s in Charge?, supra note 26, at 20.  See also Press Release, Pen-
sions Investment Research Consultants, Companies Face Increasing Risks By 
Ignoring Shareholders’ Views On Corporate Governance (Dec. 2003), available 
at http://www.pirc.co.uk/Annual_review_2003.pdf [hereinafter PIRC] (ap-
proximately 10% of companies have a combined chairman and chief execu-
tive). 
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strategy.38  However, “it is normally necessary for the approval 
of the board to be obtained for major transactions or changes in 
strategy, and [it is] sometimes necessary for shareholder ap-
proval to be obtained as well.”39  In an average company, the 
board of directors will meet monthly to discuss strategy and to 
monitor the performance of executive management.40  The board 
of directors and senior executives owe a fiduciary duty to the 
“company as a legal entity separate from its shareholders and 
creditors.”41  However, directors also have the duty, when mak-
ing decisions, to consider the interests of the company’s employ-
ees (stakeholders).42 
The right to vote is common in most ordinary shares of pub-
licly listed companies in the U.K.43  Most of the publicly listed 
U.K. companies “have only one class of ordinary shares, with 
each ordinary share carrying one vote on a poll at a general 
meeting of the company.”44  Similar to the U.S. system, the arti-
cles of association of the U.K. company will set out this one-
share, one-vote system.  There are two types of general meet-
ings where shareholders exercise their right to vote: the AGM 
and the extraordinary general meetings (“EGM”).  The matters 
upon which shareholders are required to vote are set out in the 
Companies Act of 1985, the company’s articles of association, 
the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the general law.45  
Some examples of matters on which shareholders have a right 
to vote include: changes to the articles of association,46 the com-
pany  and purchase of its own shares,47 removal of directors,48 
  
 38. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at  8. 
 42. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 309. 
 43. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 82. 
 44. Id.  See also Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 370(6) (there is a presumption 
of one vote per share on a poll and non-voting and restricted-voting shares do 
exist, but are not common). 
 45. See STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 82.  See also Cheffins & Thomas, 
supra note 3, at 287. 
 46. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 4, 9 & 17. 
 47. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 164 & 166. 
 48. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 303. 
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transactions between the company and someone related to the 
company49 and a voluntary winding up of the company.50 
B.  Composition of Share Ownership in the U.K. 
According to the most recent U.K. government survey of 
share ownership on the U.K. Stock Exchange, released in July 
2003, overseas/foreign investors account for 32.1% of U.K. eq-
uity; individuals account for 14.3%;51 banks accounts for 2.1%; 
and insurance companies, pension funds, and other institu-
tional shareholders account for 49.4%.52  Therefore, in the U.K., 
institutional shareholders hold a sweeping majority of equity 
capital of publicly-listed companies.53  Despite such a large per-
centage of equity ownership in public companies, institutional 
shareholders (e.g., pension fund trustees) are not required to 
exercise their vote.54 
The market where most publicly listed stocks are traded in 
the U.K. is the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”).55  The LSE is 
one of Europe’s leading exchanges and consists of both domestic 
and international companies.  Although the LSE has been in 
existence for approximately 200 years, in 1986 it experienced 
what is considered the “Big Bang” — when the market truly 
opened its doors and grew exponentially.  Currently, the LSE 
  
 49. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). 
 50. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 84(1) (Eng.). 
 51. The proportionate share ownership of individuals has decreased stead-
ily in the U.K.  In 1963, approximately 54% of U.K. equities were held by in-
dividuals while in 1998, the figure dropped to a mere 16.5%.  See Geof Staple-
don, Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in U.K., at 4, at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/staple.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).  Stapledon 
attributes this decline to “the growing proportionate holding of the institu-
tions, and…individuals swapping their money from directly held shares to 
indirect investment in equities via investments in unit trusts, investment 
trusts and pension funds.”  Id. 
 52. Press Release, Office of National Statistics, Share Ownership 2002, 
July 18, 2003, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/sha0703.pdf. 
 53. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 4.  Since the early 1960s, institutional 
investor equity holdings in public companies has increased significantly.  In 
1963, individuals owned approximately 54% and institutional investors owned 
29%.  However, in 1994, individuals owned a mere 20% and institutional in-
vestors owned approximately 60%.  Id. at 4–5. 
 54. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 85. 
 55. Information about the LSE is available at http://www.londonstockex-
change.com. 
File: Jackie2.20.04.doc Created on:  2/20/2004 7:31 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:35 PM 
754 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
 
has about 2,700 companies which trade on its markets (the 
main market56 has more than 2000 companies, with approxi-
mately 400 international issuers, and the secondary AIM mar-
ket57 has more than 700 companies with approximately 50 over-
seas issuers)58 for a market value of approximately £3 trillion (or 
$5.49 trillion U.S. dollars).59   
C. Corporate Governance Law in the U.S. and U.K. 
Before delving into the specifics of corporate governance law 
in both countries, it is important to note that the U.S. and U.K. 
have a “shared legal heritage encompassing the common law 
and principles of equity.”60 
In the U.S., corporate governance is monitored through a 
combination of state and federal statutes, SEC rules (regarding 
disclosures, proxies, and proposals), and common law.  Gener-
ally speaking, the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation to act in the corporation’s best interest. This means 
that directors are prohibited from self-dealing and from using 
corporate control for their own financial gain (i.e., insider trad-
ing).  Common law governs subjects such as conflicts of interest, 
fiduciary duties, self-dealing, business judgment, and waste.  
Much like the U.S., the U.K. is a common law country with its 
corporate governance law comprised of an amalgamation of dif-
ferent sources: Codes (mainly voluntary), the Companies Act of 
1985, the Stock Exchange Listing Rules, and common law. 
  
 56. Within the main market there are special groupings for certain sectors 
including techMARK (an international market for innovative technology com-
panies), techMARK Mediscience (for healthcare companies), and landMARK 
(for U.K. regional companies).  See London Stock Exchange website, at 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 57. The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a market for growing 
companies and has only been around since 1995.  See London Stock Exchange 
website, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 58. Despite the fact that about 85% of the 2,700 companies listed on the 
Exchange are U.K. companies, approximately 61% of the LSE’s equity market 
value derives from international companies.  This is most likely because the 
foreign companies which choose to trade on the LSE are comparably large.  
See London Stock Exchange website, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004). 
 59. As of the time of publication, the exchange rate is £1 to $1.86 (Feb. 9, 
2004). 
 60. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 297. 
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There are four corporate governance codes in the U.K., which 
act as “self-regulatory controls and [are] enforceable only 
through shareholder pressure and the Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules.”61  The Cadbury Code, issued in 1992, was the first such 
code promulgated in the U.K.62  The Code recognized the impor-
tance of corporate governance to the U.K.’s competitive econ-
omy63 and recommended a “Code of Best Practice,”64 which fo-
cused mainly on “openness, integrity and accountability.”65  This 
Code of Best Practice included nineteen recommendations relat-
ing to the board of directors, non-executive directors, executive 
directors, and auditors.66  For purposes of remuneration, it is 
important to note that the Cadbury Report suggested that 
shareholders be given a vote on directors’ service contracts and 
that there be full and clear disclosure of the salaries of directors 
and executives.67  In addition, the Cadbury Code recommended 
that publicly listed corporations have remuneration committees 
comprised of non-executive directors.68 
In 1995, a second code, named the Greenbury Code, was is-
sued by the Greenbury Committee, focusing solely on manage-
rial remuneration.69  The Code focused on increased disclosure 
of compensation, especially in annual reports to shareholders.70  
Similar to the preceding Cadbury Code, the Greenbury Code 
also suggested that remuneration committees for publicly listed 
  
 61. Jacqueline Cook & Simon Deakin, Empirical Evidence on Corporate 
Control, in LITERATURE SURVEY ON FACTUAL, EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ch. 
10, at 1 (1999). 
 62. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (chaired 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury), REPORT (1992) [hereinafter Cadbury Code].  
 63. Id. at  para. 1.1. 
 64. Id. at paras. 3.1–3.16. 
 65. Id. at para. 3.2. 
 66. Id. at paras. 3.1–3.16. 
 67. Id. at para. 4.40. 
 68. Id. at para. 4.42. 
 69. DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR 
RICHARD GREENBURY (1995) [hereinafter GREENBURY REPORT].  “The Green-
bury Committee was set up on the initiative of the Confederation of British 
Industry in reaction to controversies surrounding increases in managerial 
remuneration, especially in privatized utilities, and in an attempt to pre-empt 
government action to deal with executive pay.”  Cook & Deakin, supra note 
61, at ch. 10, at 1. 
 70. GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 69, at B1–B12. 
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corporations consist of non-executive directors.71  It went further 
to suggest that shareholders should have direct access to the 
chairman of the company’s remuneration committee at the an-
nual meeting.72  
In 1998, the Hampel Report was published, restating, many 
of the same corporate governance concerns.73  The Report 
stressed the end of the “box ticking” approach to corporate gov-
ernance74 — the drafters of the Report did not want U.K. com-
panies to merely look down a list of good corporate governance 
practices and check them off as they accomplished them.  In 
other words, the Report aimed for corporate governance as a 
means (to a competitive international economy in the U.K.), not 
as an end in itself.75  The Report developed a set of principles, as 
opposed to the guidelines which the preceding codes had deline-
ated.76  According to Hampel, the single overriding objective of 
all listed companies should be to enhance shareholder wealth.  
The Report, however, was met with a mixed reaction since it 
left open many questions, such as “What is a principle, and 
what is a rule?” and “What will companies have to comply 
with?”77 
The Combined Code, which followed the Hampel Report and 
is known as the Code of Codes, is essentially a combination of 
all three voluntary codes.78  It adopted the principles set out in 
the Hampel Report and covered all issues of corporate govern-
ance including, board issues, remuneration, the role of the 
  
 71. Id. at A1, A4. 
 72. Id. at A8. 
 73. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (London, Gee Publishing, 1998) [hereinafter HAMPEL 
REPORT]. 
 74. The “box-ticking” approach refers to a corporate practice by which 
“shareholders are only interested in whether the letter of the rule ha[s] been 
complied with.”  See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 73, at paras. 1.11–1.14.  See 
also Unpacking Hampel, The Committee’s Preliminary Report, INTELLIGENCE 
(July/Aug. 1997). 
 75. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 73, at para. 1.21. 
 76. Id. at paras. 2.1-2.2. 
 77. See Unpacking Hampel, supra note 74 (also stating that “one auditor 
told the Financial Times, ‘it’s all pretty confusing.’”). 
 78. The Combined Code is included in the appendix to the Listing Rules, 
which are administered by the U.K. Financial Services Authority in its capac-
ity as the U.K. Listing Authority (“UKLA”).  See Financial Services Authority, 
Listing Rules, § 1, paras. B1–B3, Schedules A, B (June 1998). 
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shareholders, financial reporting, auditing and transparency.  
The Combined Code is unique among its predecessors, whereas 
the other codes were voluntary, it is made mandatory to pub-
licly listed companies by Rule 12.43A of the Listing Rules for 
the LSE.  Although it technically has the force of law, a com-
pany may choose not to comply with the Combined Code, which 
is conditioned on the company explaining the reasons for its 
noncompliance — often called “comply or explain.”  Unfortu-
nately, “in many cases the companies’ explanations for non-
compliance are either weak or non-existent.”79  In addition, 
“while compliance has improved [since the Code was promul-
gated], only around one in three listed companies (34%) fully 
complies with the existing Combined Code.” 80  Therefore, de-
spite the fact that the Combined Code leads to greater trans-
parency of corporate governance practices, it loses some of its 
“bite” since a company still has a choice not to comply as long as 
it justifies its reasons.81  Recently, the Code was amended to 
incorporate recommendations regarding non-executive directors 
and audit committees.82 
In January 2003, a report entitled “Review of the Role and Ef-
fectiveness of Non-Executive Directors” was published by a 
committee led by Derek Higgs.83  This report is more widely 
known as the Higgs Review or the Higgs Report.  The review 
focused on issues such as the role of non-executive directors, 
attracting and recruiting non-executive directors, the ways in 
which the effective performance of non-executive directors could 
be enhanced  and the relationship between shareholders and 
  
 79. PIRC, supra note 37. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, pmbl., paras. 3–5 (June 
1998). 
 82. The new Combined Code was published by the Financial Reporting 
Council on July 23, 2003. 
 83. See Higgs Report, supra note 35.  It should be noted that on the same 
day, the Smith Report was also published, which clarified and expanded the 
roles and responsibilities of audit committees.  Clearly, the Smith Report was 
a “response to issues raised by the major corporate failures in 2002.”  Michael 
Hammill, Corporate Governance — Proposed Changes in the U.K.,  INT’L 
COMPANY & COMM. L. REV., 2003, 14(9), N102-104, at N102 (also summarizing 
the main key recommendations of the Smith Report).  While noteworthy, the 
Smith Report is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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non-executive directors.84  The report made proposals with re-
gard to each of these topics, including a proposal that quoted 
company boards should be comprised of a majority of non-
executive directors and only these non-executive directors 
should comprise the remuneration board.85  In general, the re-
port “envisages a more demanding and important role for non-
executive directors.”86  Higgs was generally met with favorable 
reviews, which included an endorsement from Patricia Hewitt, 
Secretary of State of the U.K. Department of Trade and Indus-
try (hereinafter “DTI”).87  The Higgs Report was incorporated 
into the amended Combined Code in July 2003.88 
Indeed, the DTI has been very active in making recommenda-
tions to the U.K. government regarding directors’ remunera-
tion.  The DTI has published three consultative documents and 
has made many noteworthy proposals to the U.K. government 
to enhance corporate governance in the area of executive pay.89 
In July 1999, the DTI published its first consultative docu-
ment on the topic of directors’ remuneration.90  In its foreword, 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry noted the impor-
tance of British companies offering remuneration packages that 
attracted the “best executives to run their businesses” while 
simultaneously linking pay to performance.91  This document 
focused principally on the following issues: 1) the independence 
and effectiveness of the board’s remuneration committee; 2) the 
way in which rewards are linked to performance to encourage 
enhanced performance by directors; 3) companies’ reporting to 
  
 84. See Higgs Report, supra note 35, at 5–10 (Summary of Recommenda-
tions). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Hammill, supra note 83, at N102 (summing up the main key recom-
mendations of the Higgs Report). 
 87. Press Release, DTI and Her Majesty’s Treasury, Government Wel-
comes Reports on the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors and 
on Audit Committees (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk.  But 
see Alistair Alcock, Higgs — The Wrong Answer, COMP. L. 24(6), 161 (2003) 
(arguing that the Higgs proposals will lead to increased domination of the 
CEO). 
 88. Alcock, supra note 87, at 161. 
 89. See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 90. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July 
1999). 
 91. See id. at Foreword. 
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shareholders of their general policy on executive remuneration, 
particularly with regard to linkage to performance; 4) compen-
sation payments to directors on loss of office; and 5) the board’s 
accountability to shareholders on remuneration policy.92  DTI 
recommended that all quoted companies should have a remu-
neration committee composed of independent non-executive di-
rectors, that executive pay should be linked to performance, and 
that the disclosure for individual directors’ remuneration 
should be simplified for easier comprehension.93  In addition, the 
DTI recommended strengthening the disclosure provisions on 
service contracts and compensation arrangements improving 
accountability by requiring quoted companies to ask sharehold-
ers to vote on the board’s remuneration every year, as well as 
voting on its remuneration policy.94  Other proposals included 
requiring directors of quoted companies and the chairman of 
the remuneration committee to stand for election or re-election 
every year and for the creation of special procedures by which 
shareholders could move a remuneration resolution at the 
AGM.95  
In December 2001, the DTI published its second consultative 
document on executive pay.96  This document recommended that 
companies: (1) publish a report on directors’ remuneration as 
part of the company’s annual reporting cycle; (2) disclose within 
the report details of individual directors’ remuneration pack-
ages, remuneration policy, the remuneration committee, the 
policy on the duration of directors’ contracts, and the payments 
made upon severance; (3) display a line graph showing company 
performance; and (4) put an annual resolution to shareholders 
on the remuneration report.97 
In June 2003, the DTI published a third consultative docu-
ment on directors’ remuneration, entitled “‘Rewards for Failure’ 
  
 92. See id. at ch. 1, para. 1.2. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at paras. 5.10–5.11, 6.12–6.13. 
 95. See id. at paras. 7.17–7.23. 
 96. See generally DTI, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUN- 
ERATION (Dec. 2001). 
 97. Id. at para. 1.1.  This proposal became law when the U.K. Parliament 
passed an amendment to the U.K. Companies Act, which went into effect on 
August 1, 2002.  See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 
2002/1986, §§ 3, 7–9. 
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Directors’ Remuneration — Contracts, Performance and Sever-
ance” which focused mainly on severance payments to direc-
tors.98  Patricia Hewitt, the Secretary of State for Trade and In-
dustry, stated in the foreword to this document that the “in-
crease in the level of shareholder activism on the issue of direc-
tors’ remuneration…is very much a result of the new require-
ments on disclosure and a shareholder vote which the Govern-
ment has introduced.”99  Despite progress, DTI recognized that 
further reforms were necessary.  For example, they made the 
following suggestions: (1) amending the Companies Act of 1985 
to require compensation payments to be fair and reasonable100 
and (2) amending section 319 of the Companies Act of 1985 to 
reduce the statutory contract period.101  The U.K. government 
should soon be responding to this latest consultative document 
by announcing how it proposes to proceed.102     
  
 98. See DTI, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, “REWARDS FOR FAILURE” DIRECTORS’ 
REMUNERATION – CONTRACTS, PERFORMANCE AND SEVERANCE (June 2003), 
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/published.htm [hereinafter REWARDS 
FOR FAILURE]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. A bill entitled “Company Directors’ Performance and Compensation,” 
published on December 11, 2002 and now withdrawn, was introduced by 
Archie Norman in Parliament and suggested the insertion of a new section 
316A into the Companies Act of 1985.  This new section would require that 
upon a director’s termination from office or employment, the amount of com-
pensation paid to such director should be “fair and reasonable having regard 
to any failure by the director in the performance of his duties either in his 
office as director or as an employee or both.”  The full text of the bill is avail-
able at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/022/2003 
022.htm.  For a brief discussion of the proposed bill, entitled the “Company 
Directors’ Performance and Compensation Bill,” see Mike Woodley, Big Re-
wards for Big Failures, COMPANY L. 2003, 24(8), 247–48 (2003). 
 101. Currently, § 319 allows companies to enter into contracts with execu-
tives in excess of five years if shareholders give their approval.  See Compa-
nies Act 1985, § 319.  The DTI proposes lessening this five year period to three 
years.  See REWARDS FOR FAILURE, supra note 98, at paras. 3.16–3.20. 
 102. The consultation period, during which commentary on the report is 
received, closed on September 30, 2003.  The next step is for the U.K. govern-
ment to publish a summary of the responses and announce its own actions.  
See Hammill, supra note 83, at N122.  Hammill has noted that 
“[c]ommentaries on the Consultative Document and responses published to 
date show a polarization of opinions.”  Id. 
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III. IS EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXCESSIVE? 
Before embarking on a discussion regarding how sharehold-
ers can “fix” the problem of excessive executive compensation, 
the question must first be asked: Are executives being paid too 
much?103 
There are two classes of people arguing the issue of executive 
compensation: those who believe that executive compensation is 
excessive and those who do not.104  Those who believe that ex-
ecutives are overpaid argue that there is little relationship be-
tween executive compensation and executive performance.105  
Indeed, “pay for performance” has caustically been referred to 
as “pay-for-attendance.”106  This group argues that the substan-
tial pay differential between executives and rank and file em-
ployees (especially in the U.S.) is a justification for lowering 
executive compensation.107  Indeed, the pay differential between 
executives and rank and file employees is spiraling out of con-
trol.108  For example, in 1980, executives in the U.S. earned ap-
proximately 40 times that of the average production worker.109  
This figure rose to 85 in 1990, and today it is approximated that 
executives earn about 400 times more than the average produc-
tion workers.110  Recently, the chairman of the Catholic Funds, a 
  
 103. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (“No serious consideration of solutions to the 
‘problem’ of executive compensation should proceed before determining 
whether, in fact, CEOs are overpaid.”). 
 104. Id. at 2. 
 105. Id.  For example, executives of utility companies in the U.K., that were 
privatized under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government, were 
awarded substantial increases in pay despite the fact that profits were a re-
sult of “privileged access to markets” and not executive performance. Cheffins 
& Thomas, supra note 3, at 279. 
 106. Useem, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Matt Ward, an independent pay 
consultant). 
 107. Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More than Your Executive: Ra-
tionalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 63, 64–65 
(2001) [hereinafter My Executive Makes More than Your Executive]. 
 108. See Gretchen Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So 
Much, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, sec. 3 at 1. 
 109. Where’s the Stick? Carrots, Sticks and Bosses’ Pay, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 
2003, at 13. 
 110. Id.  A study conducted in 2000 by Towers Perrin found that the pay 
differential between CEOs and lower-level employees was closer to 531 to 1.  
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$30 million fund company in Milwaukee, submitted a proposal 
to seven companies which would limit CEO pay to a figure that 
is 100 times that of the average worker.111 As of 2000, in the 
U.K., it was estimated that executives earned only twenty-five 
times more112 than rank and file employees.113  “According to a 
recent Incomes Data Services report, the total earnings of FTSE 
100 chief executives rose 89% in the five years [leading up] to 
2001, while full-time employees received a 28.7% rise.”114 
Those who argue that executive pay is not excessive suggest 
that a “free market fixes compensation.”115  In other words, this 
group believes that executive compensation can be rationalized 
due to the combination of a “large pool of potential executives,” 
“companies bidding for their services,” and a “wealth of infor-
mation available about compensation.”116  Others argue that it 
would be too difficult to link executive pay to performance be-
cause the company cannot “distinguish between those achieve-
ments stemming from the CEO’s contribution versus those that 
are a result of favorable economic conditions or other factors.”117  
In the same vein, it is too difficult to link the success or failure 
  
Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, supra note 
108, at sec. 3 at 1. 
 111. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, 
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1.  The seven companies included Cendant, Com-
puware, Delta Air Lines, the El Paso Corporation, International Paper, Sun 
Microsystems, and Viacom.  The SEC must determine whether the proposal 
will be allowed to be included in the companies’ proxy materials.  Id. 
 112. Another study has stated that the pay differential in the U.K. is closer 
to 20 to one.  See Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 279. 
 113. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, 
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1.  The study was conducted by Towers Perrin in 
2000. It also found that in Brazil the pay gap is 57 to 1; in Mexico it is 45 to 1; 
in Canada it is 21 to 1; in France it is 16 to 1; in Germany,  it is 11 to 1; and in 
Japan, it is approximately 10 to 1.  Id. 
 114. Julia Finch & Jill Treanor, Executive Pay Leaps Ahead 17%, GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 4, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/executivepay/story/0,12 
04,804389,00.html. 
 115. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 2. 
 116. Id.  Cf. Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensa-
tion in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138 (1995) (ar-
guing that the pay-for-performance method of compensation is inadequate to 
address the concerns of excessive compensation and that the courts should 
focus on equity ownership as a solution). 
 117. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, 
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1. 
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of a corporation to the performance of one individual.118  Some 
among this group believe that executive compensation is not a 
matter for public debate — it is simply “a matter for the com-
pany and shareholders.”119  Indeed, “by and large, [even] gov-
ernments are reluctant to intervene in the private matter of 
employment contracts.”120  Yet, there is substantial commentary 
and evidence finding that the market for executives is simply 
inefficient.121  This has come to be known as the Lake Woebegon 
effect — taking its title from the novel by Garrison Keillor enti-
tled “Lake Woebegon Days,” wherein all of the children in Lake 
Woebegon are “above average.”122  A market has developed for 
corporate executives in which all executives are considered 
“above average” and, consequently are paid at “above average” 
prices — thus causing “bosses’ pay to spiral[] upwards.”123  CEO 
pay has ratcheted upward because “[n]o [executive] selection 
committee wants to award their new [executive] less than the 
industry average.”124  Others have referred to the free-market 
system for corporate executives as “the Golden Rule gone 
wrong, CEOs do unto others as they would have [the executives] 
do unto them.”125  Further adding to the Lake Woebegon effect is 
the globalization of the market for executives.126  With the mar-
ket for executives becoming increasingly global (in 2002, a 
study found that 10% of CEOs on the FTSE 100 were non-
  
 118. Id. 
 119. Saleem Sheikh, The Greenbury Report: Fond Hope, Faint Promise, 10 
(11) J. INT’L BUS. L. 471 (1995). 
 120. Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 64. 
 121. See Bosses for Sale, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 57 (suggesting that the 
market for executives is secretive, restricted, bad at price-settings and gener-
ally run by the head hunter firms).  See also Where’s the Stick?, supra note 
109, at 13; Useem, supra note 9, at 58.   
 122. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109, at 13. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 66. 
 125. Useem, supra note 9, at 64 (quoting Harvard Business School Professor 
Rakesh Khurana). 
 126. Therese Raphael, Hunting Fat Cats, Shooting Wild, WALL ST. J. 
(Europe), June 26, 2002, at A9 (stating that the global market for executives 
has increased executive pay in the U.K.).  See also Evelina Shmukler, HBOS 
Girds to Approve Executive-Pay Schemes, WALL ST. J. (Europe), May 14, 2002, 
at M6 (stating that since the market for executives is international, U.K. 
banks must increase salaries to attract executive talent and “keep up with the 
compensation offered across the ocean”). 
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British),127 countries must increase salaries in order to attract 
talented executives.128 
There are also those that agree that compensation is substan-
tial, but find that it is justified by a variety of factors.  For ex-
ample, some argue that, empirically speaking, “[m]uch of the 
increase in CEO pay is directly attributable to the increase in 
stock prices over the past two decades, as the portion of CEO 
pay in stock options has risen dramatically in the past several 
years.”129  Moreover, this group justifies the substantial pay dif-
ferentials between executives and rank and file employees by 
arguing that the figures should not be taken at face value.   
Perhaps the U.S.’ pay differential is not as bad as it appears 
at first glance.130  For example, “certain valuable and traditional 
components of an American compensation package take the 
form of benefits that are governmentally provided in other 
countries.”131  In addition, since tax rates in many other coun-
tries are higher than in the U.S., executives in other countries 
may receive a “significant amount of nontaxable compensation, 
far in excess of the types of fringe benefits most American ex-
ecutives are accustomed to receiving.”132  Lastly, they argue that 
CEOs in the U.S. actually have a more substantial job descrip-
tion, and thus have a “high level of responsibility and direct 
  
 127. Raphael, supra note 126, at A9. 
 128. Id.  See also Shmukler, supra note 126, at M6.  But see Nick Isles, Life 
at the Top: The Labour Market for FTSE-250 Chief Executives, The Work 
Foundation, available at http://www.theworkfoundation.com/pdf/Life_atthe_ 
Top.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 1004) (arguing that “the FTSE-250 market is very 
home-grown…[and] [c]ompanies are behaving rationally by grooming talented 
members of staff to take over the top job when it becomes available.”). 
 129. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 4–5. 
 130. Id. at 5 (“Had the stock market declined over this period [of the past 
two decades], the change in the differential between CEO and average worker 
compensation would look quite different, as the average worker is not paid in 
stock options.”).  Others argue that U.S. culture is simply more accepting of 
greater pay differentials than other countries. See Norma Cohen, Britain 
Points Up Cultural Divide, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 9 (quoting Stuart Bell, 
research director at PIRC: “The main difference is that U.S. society is more 
encouraging of, and tolerant of, a high-earning culture.”). 
 131. My Executive Makes More than Your Executive, supra note 107, at 66. 
 132. Id. at 65.  For example, “[g]enerous housing allowances are not un-
common and it is not unheard of for bonuses to be paid outside of the execu-
tive’s country to avoid the imposition of income tax.”  Id. at 65–66.  In Ger-
many, a company may pay its executives a “second salary in a tax haven, 
which is not reported.”  Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 66–67. 
File: Jackie2.20.04.doc Created on: 2/20/2004 7:31 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:35 PM 
2004] CHALLENGING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 765 
 
involvement in managing the corporation.”133  Indeed, although 
CEO compensation in the U.S. has risen faster than that of the 
average employee, it “has risen much slower than the pay of 
professional athletes.”134 
Still, when comparing the U.S. and the U.K., the empirical 
data is undeniable: CEOs in the U.S. earn 45% higher cash 
compensation and 190% higher total compensation.135  One 
study found that salary levels for U.S. CEOs can be up to ten 
times higher than their U.K. counterparts.136  For example, Dis-
ney’s CEO, Michael Eisner, nicknamed the “Prince of Pay,”137 
exercised options in 1997 that were worth more than the aggre-
gate salaries of the top 500 CEOs in the U.K.138  More recently, 
when Eisner failed to meet the requirements that would entitle 
him to a bonus two years in a row, “his board lowered the per-
formance bar” so he could receive a bonus.139  In fact, Britain’s 
highest-paid executive in 1999,140 Sam Chisolm (of British Sky 
Broadcasting), “would only [have] rank[ed] as the 97th highest 
among U.S. chief executives.”141  Mark Swartz, former Chief Fi-
  
 133. My Executive Makes More than Your Executive, supra note 107, at 66–
67. 
 134. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 5 (“During the period 1980-95, the pay 
of the average worker increased 60%, that of CEOs 380%, National Basketball 
Association players 640%, National Football League players 800%, and Major 
League Baseball players 1000%.”). 
 135. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? 
CEO Pay in the U.S. and U.K., 110 ECON. J. F640, F641 (2000).  But see Graef 
Crystal, U.K. CEO Pay has Nothing to Do with Performance, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2002 (stating that “[c]hief executive officers’ pay in the U.K. 
defies reason even more than it does in the U.S.”) (on file with author). 
 136. Isles, supra note 128. 
 137. Bloomberg columnist and long time pay-critic Graef Crystal gave Eis-
ner this title in 1991.  See Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Useem, supra note 9, at 59. 
 140. In 2002, Bart Becht, Chief Executive of Reckitt Benckiser, an Anglo-
Dutch household products conglomerate, was the highest paid executive in the 
U.K., earning £9million — approximately $14 million (which includes £5.7 
million — about $10.4 million — in stock options).  Richard Wray, Low Profile 
of Highest Paid Boss, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2002. 
 141. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640–41.  Since U.S. companies 
are larger, more successful, or in faster growing industries, the empirical 
study accounted and controlled for firm size, industry, growth opportunities, 
and CEO’s individual skills and abilities.  Id.  The current CEO of BSkyB, 
Tony Ball, earned £7.8 million in 2001 even though the company performed 
 
File: Jackie2.20.04.doc Created on:  2/20/2004 7:31 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:35 PM 
766 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
 
nancial Officer of Tyco, won the prize for top-paid executive at 
an S&P 500 company in 2002 — “pull[ing] in a whopping $136 
million.”142  Swartz’s cohort, Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of 
Tyco, was the second-highest-paid executive with $82 million.143  
In fact, a study by Equilar, an independent provider of compen-
sation data, found that the median compensation of CEOs of the 
100 largest companies in the U.S. rose 14% in 2002, while the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 plunged 22.1% that same year.144  Un-
doubtedly, the recent scandal over the $140 million lump-sum 
cash payments given to Richard Grasso, chairman of the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which were in addition to his 
base salary of $1.4 million and bonus of at least $1 million, 
sparked the most controversy of all U.S. compensation payouts 
in 2003.145  Part of the outcry related to the fact that the NYSE 
is not a publicly traded entity and, as the world’s largest stock 
exchange, serves as a “quasi-public institution with an impor-
tant regulatory function.”146   Accordingly, these payments were 
“more in line with what chief executives of public corporations 
are paid and are far above the pay of top officials at the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, NASD and even Nasdaq, a 
primary competitor to the Big Board.”147  Under a cacophony of 
calls for resignation from the NYSE, institutional investors, and 
even politicians, Grasso resigned from the NYSE in September 
2003.148 
  
extremely poorly that year.  See Finch & Treanor, Executive Pay Leaps Ahead 
17%, supra note 114. 
 142. Useem, supra note 9, at 57. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 58.  The study also found that average CEO compensation 
dropped by 23% in 2002, but Fortune magazine attributed this decline to the 
significant pay decrease of a few “mega-earners.”  Id. 
 145. Landon Thomas, Jr., Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at C1; Landon Thomas, Jr., A Pay Package That 
Fat Cats Call Excessive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at C1; Susanne Craig & 
Kate Kelly, Large Investors Call for Grasso to Leave NYSE, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
17, 2003, at C1. 
 146. Thomas, supra note 122, at C6. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Grasso, Who Wanted to be a Cop, In the 
End Showed that he Knew When It Was Time to Surrender, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
18, 2003, at C1. 
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This is not to suggest, however, that executive remuneration 
in the U.K. is not excessive.149  In fact, one study reported that 
“[f]rom 1993 to 2002, the median salary of the highest paid di-
rector in FTSE 100 companies rose 92% from £301,000 to 
£579,000.”150  In addition, “[t]he maximum level of annual bo-
nuses [] significantly increased” — in 1999, annual bonuses 
were the equivalent of 40-60% of an executive’s salary, while in 
2000, they were the equivalent of 100% or more.151  The study 
also found “[a] similarly inflationary trend…for share-based 
incentive schemes.”152  “A recent poll in Britain found that 80% 
of people believe that top directors are overpaid.”153  Compara-
tively, “British executives earn more than their European coun-
terparts on average, but less than Americans.”154  Indeed, “the 
U.K. is second only to the U.S. in terms of the global league for 
CEO pay.”155 Unfortunately, these pay standards are on the 
rise.156 
  
 149. See British Solutions to ‘Fat Cat’ Pay, PAY FOR PERFORMANCE REPORT, 
Oct. 1, 2001, available at  www.ioma.com/mr/uploads/pfp2_smp.pdf (“Although 
executive compensation in the U.K. takes different forms from that in the 
U.S., ‘the politically charged issue of boardroom pay continues to hit the head-
lines’….”) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Kreinberg, supra note 116, at 139 (sug-
gesting that the collapse of Barings PLC, a 233-year-old British banking insti-
tution, may have been caused by Barings’ excessive incentive compensation 
plan, which “led to the payment of 50% of gross earnings in the form of bo-
nuses”). 
 150. Press Release, PIRC, PIRC Highlights Huge Increase In Potential And 
Real Directors’ Remuneration  In Trade & Industry Committee Evidence (July 
1, 2003), available at http://www.pirc.co.uk/trade%20&%20industry%20ctte. 
pdf. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109, at 13. 
 154. Raphael, supra note 104, at A9. 
 155. Isles, supra note 128. 
 156. Raphael, supra note 104, at A9.  Raphael attributes the rise of salaries 
of British executives to the globalization of British companies and the fact 
that the market for executives has become more global.  She states that 10% 
of CEOs on the FTSE 100 are non-British, compared to 2% a decade ago.  She 
also states that greater transparency “has made CEOs more aware of what 
their peers are earning.”  Id.  See also Crystal, supra note 136 (stating that 
“CEO pay in the U.K., which seriously lagged behind the pay of American 
CEOs for years, is on its way to catching up” and finding that the gap between 
pay in the two countries has narrowed from U.S. CEOs earning 3.2 times that 
of U.K. counterparts in 1993, to only 1.1 times in 2002). 
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Regardless, these extravagant executive salaries have not 
gone unnoticed by shareholders in the U.K.  For example, 
shareholders of Vodafone were quite vocal when Vodafone “pro-
posed making a £10 million157 ‘one-off’ bonus payment to the 
chief executive [Christopher Gent] who had orchestrated acqui-
sitions that resulted in the company becoming the world’s larg-
est mobile telephone concern.”158  Despite heavy criticism follow-
ing these events in 2000, Gent only recently volunteered to step 
down as chief executive.159  Termination contracts, to reward 
executives leaving a corporation, are also a problem in the U.K.  
These “golden goodbyes”160 have caught the eye, and voice, of 
shareholders.  For example, when Ken Berry, music industry 
veteran, was paid £6.1 million (approximately $11.2 million 
U.S. dollars) last year upon leaving the corporation, sharehold-
ers were outraged and, subsequently, there was “a redesign of 
the company’s pay structure.”161  The DTI’s third consultative 
document, published in June 2003, focused specifically on sev-
erance packages of executives and made recommendations to 
  
 157. This is the equivalent of approximately $18.6 million U.S. dollars (as of 
February 9, 2004). 
 158. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 281.  Oliver Burkeman, You’d be 
Smiling Too, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/mobile/article/0,2763,1107234,00.html (describing how Gent was rewarded 
with a £10 million “transaction bonus,” in addition to his £1.2 million salary 
after negotiating the takeover of Mannesmann, a German telecom giant, 
which shareholders felt was “obscenely overvalued.”).  In 2000, Gent was paid 
nearly £6 million, despite the fact that shareholders lost nearly 20%.  John 
Duckers, Time to Stop These Fat-Cats Running Away With Cream, 
BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at 26.  After criticism from institutional 
investors and several publications, Gent “was persuaded to take half the sum 
in shares.”  See Burkeman, You’d be Smiling Too, supra note 158. 
 159. Burkeman, You’d be Smiling Too, supra note 158.  Notably, however, 
on June 19, 2002, Vodafone issued a press release stating that it had engaged 
in extensive consultation over its new remuneration policy with shareholder 
groups. 
 160. See Jill Treanor, Multimillion Deals Give a Golden Goodbye to Ousted 
Executives, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2002 (Seven directors in the U.K. were given 
more than £1million to leave their executive positions in 2001). 
 161. See id.  Mr. Berry had made his reputation by signing the Spice Girls, 
but then lost it after signing Mariah Carey to a contract for an album that 
flopped.  As a result of Berry’s poor judgment, EMI paid almost £38 million to 
terminate the contract with Mariah Carey. Id.  See also Finch & Treanor, 
Executive Pay Leaps Ahead 17%, supra note 114. 
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the U.K. government.162  Regardless of whether the company is 
located in the U.S. or the U.K., there is guaranteed to be lively 
debate and outright criticism regarding the sometimes outra-
geous compensation paid to executives. 
IV. SETTING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND DISCLOSURE 
RULES 
Aside from the issue of whether CEOs are being paid too 
much, there is also the issue of why CEOs are being so well 
compensated.163  This question is intertwined with yet another 
question: Who sets remuneration figures and policies, and how 
much do they have to disclose about such issues? 
In fact, in public companies in the U.S. and the U.K. “execu-
tive pay is set in much the same way.”164  In both countries, the 
board is empowered not only to appoint executives, but also to 
set their compensation.  However, “the prevailing orthodoxy is 
that directors of a publicly quoted company should delegate de-
cisions concerning executive pay to a remuneration or ‘compen-
sation’ committee made up of outside directors.”165  Ironically 
enough, both countries are concerned that the “outside direc-
tors” are not truly “outside” and are thus influenced in their 
decision-making by the directors who appointed them.   
A. By what methods or financial instruments are executives 
paid? 
Beside the difference in the amount of executive payment be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K., there is also a difference in the 
manner of payment.  Executive compensation can take the form 
of annual salary, bonuses, share/stock options, and long-term 
incentive plans (LTIPs).166  In fact, both U.S. and U.K. execu-
  
 162. See generally DTI, Consultative Document, Directors’ Remuneration 
(Dec. 2001). 
 163. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 4 (“Overlaying all of these argu-
ments [that CEOs are paid excessively] is the structural argument — corpo-
rate boards are ‘captured’ by the CEO and thus incapable of bargaining with 
the CEO.”). 
 164. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 298. 
 165. Id. 
 166. In the U.K., LTIPs are usually grants of shares of stock that become 
vested (ownership is transferred) upon attainment of specified performance 
objectives by the executive.  In the U.S., LTIPs take the form of either (1) “‘re-
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tives are paid through a combination of these financial instru-
ments.167  However, the percentage of each that comprises the 
executive’s overall salary differs from one to the other.  
In the U.S., an executive’s annual base salary comprises ap-
proximately 18% of his total compensation; whereas, in the 
U.K., an executive’s annual base salary is closer to 40%.168  On 
average, stock options comprise 61% of executive compensation 
in the U.S.,169 whereas they compromise only 45% payment of 
executive compensation in the U.K.170  Thus, U.S. corporate ex-
ecutives rely less on salary and more on stock options; whereas, 
U.K. executives rely more on fixed salary.171  However, restricted 
stock, is becoming more popular as a form of executive pay in 
the U.S.172 
Both U.S. and U.K. executives are paid annual bonuses, as 
well.  In a 2000 study, it was found that 17% of U.S. executives 
compensation was in the form of an annual bonus; whereas, in 
the U.K., approximately 18% of executives compensation is 
through an annual bonus.173  Although these percentages are 
close, in the U.K. an increasing amount of executive compensa-
tion is being paid as bonuses.174  Generally speaking, however, 
U.S. executives are awarded annual bonuses that are approxi-
mately three times more than their U.K. counterparts.175   
It is important to note that the manner of payment can affect 
the link between executive pay and share performance.176  It 
  
stricted stock’ grants that vest with the passage of time” (and are unrelated to 
pre-stated performance objectives), or (2) multi-year bonus plans, which are 
usually based on “rolling-average three or five-year cumulative accounting 
performance.”  Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F644. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Wade Lambert, Shared Pain: Teaching a Lesson in Entrepreneurship 
Costs One CEO Dearly – Forgoing Salary for Stock Doesn’t Pay for Interna-
tional Power’s Peter Giller, WALL ST. J. (Europe), June 12, 2002, at A1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Hill & Daniel, supra note 9, at 9. 
 173. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640–41. 
 174. Isles, supra note 128 (citing statistics that five years ago, the upper 
limit for annual bonuses was 40% to 60% of an executive’s base salary, but by 
2003 that upper limit rose to 100% of base salary). 
 175. See Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F648. 
 176. Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through 
a Partnership Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153, 
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would seem that CEOs with a greater percentage of their total 
pay in the form of stock options would have a greater incentive 
to increase the price of those shares.  However, the grant of 
large stock options can have one of two results: it will either 
make the CEO work harder to increase the value of the com-
pany and its shares, or it will give the CEO incentive to ma-
nipulate the stock price (because of his or her own stake in the 
price of the shares).177  
B.  The Law Regarding Setting Executive Compensation in the 
U.S. 
In a U.S. corporation, the articles of incorporation empower 
the board of directors to appoint executives.178  In addition, the 
board of directors is generally responsible for setting executive 
compensation.179  In most publicly-listed U.S. corporations, how-
ever, the board of directors delegates the job of determining 
compensation to a compensation committee.180  The corporation’s 
human resources department submits pay proposals for com-
pensation committee considerations, with the help of an inde-
pendent, outside compensation consultant.181  The compensation 
committee will then make a recommendation to the board of 
executives, which routinely approves such recommendations 
  
202–20 (2000) [hereinafter Vieweing Corporate Executive Compensation 
Through a Partnership Lens]. 
 177. The details of such arguments are beyond the scope of this Note, but it 
should be noted that both consequences exist.  Id. 
 178. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, supra note 24, §1.01, at 1–2; VARALLO & 
DREISBACH, supra note 23, at 14–15. 
 179. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 176, at 187. 
 180. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder 
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1999). 
 181. Id. at 1026–27.  “Most of these experts come from a handful of well-
known consulting firms specializing in executive compensation matters, many 
of which provide a wide variety of other consulting services to the company.” 
Id.  This practice of hiring a high-paid compensation consultant has been 
criticized by Warren Buffet, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and an 
outspoken proponent of strong corporate governance.  Buffett has stated that 
“when the compensation committee — armed as always with support from a 
high-paid consultant — reports on a mega-grant of options to the CEO, it 
would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to suggest that the 
committee reconsider.”  Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting War-
ren Buffett). 
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“without much inquiry.”182  It is important to note that 
“[s]hareholders have no direct input in this process…They can 
voice their opinions to the board of directors in a variety of ways 
before and after the package is approved, but this only indi-
rectly affects the outcome of the process.”183 
Disclosure is one aspect of U.S. corporate governance law that 
has a profound effect on compensation policies since “there is 
reason to believe that disclosure might have a restraining effect 
on the level of compensation.”184  Some argue, however, that dis-
closure “encourages better compensation plans (in terms of 
aligning managers’ interests with shareholders’).”185  Unsurpris-
ingly, the SEC,  with regard to disclosure of executive compen-
sation and compensation policies, favors heightened disclosure 
by companies.186 
In the early 1990s, the SEC tightened its disclosure regula-
tions regarding executive compensation.  Although it does not 
limit or cap executive compensation, the SEC enacted rules af-
fecting corporate disclosure of executive compensation for proxy 
and information statements.187  For example, corporations are 
required to produce and disclose a “Summary Compensation 
Table,” which shows annual and long-term compensation in a 
single comprehensive form.188  In addition, the board’s Compen-
sation Committee must report the corporate performance fac-
tors it relied on in making specific compensation awards, and 
must also report the corporation’s general compensation poli-
cies.189  Finally, the corporation must prepare a “Performance 
Graph,” comparing shareholder return over the past five years 
  
 182. Thomas & Martin, supra note 180, at 1027. 
 183. Id. (but noting that boards will take shareholders’ views into considera-
tion to insure the passage of any proposed stock option plan). 
 184. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 23. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See generally Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).  See also SEC, Execu-
tive Compensation: A Guide for Investors, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/pubs/exec omp0803.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2004).  Extensive disclo-
sure should lower the cost of monitoring for shareholders.  Id. 
 187. See SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release of 1992, supra 
note 186. 
 188. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.402, 229.402 (1999). 
 189. See id. 
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to shareholders in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, and to a 
group of peer companies chosen by the corporation.190 
Setting compensation is an area that is mainly left to the 
good judgment of the corporation and is thus an area that the 
judicial system usually declines to examine.191  Courts generally 
leave compensation questions to the business judgment of a 
corporation or the SEC.192  For example, in Lewis v. Vogelstein, a 
leading case on the issue of shareholder derivative suits for ex-
cessive executive pay, the Delaware Chancery Court held that 
plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for breach of the duty 
of disclosure (regarding executive stock options plans which 
were approved by shareholder vote) primarily because the com-
pany’s failure to disclose the value of the stock options was 
more a result of uncertainty in valuing stock options than in-
tentional manipulation on the part of the board.193  Although the 
court did not dismiss the complaint entirely, it did note that the 
plaintiffs would face the large burden of overcoming Delaware’s 
high waste standard in order to proceed.194   In order to deter-
mine that the stock options constituted waste of the corpora-
tion’s assets, the plaintiffs would have to show that the stock 
options were “in effect a gift” and that no substantial consider-
ation was received by the corporation in exchange for the 
grant.195  The court noted that the corporation gets the benefit of 
a “good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transac-
tion is worthwhile.”196  More recently, however, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery allowed a shareholder derivative action to go 
forward, basing their decision on the Disney Company’s lack of 
due care in granting a $140 million severance package and 
  
 190. Id. 
 191. See Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 176, at 181–82. 
 192. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332–33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“Judg-
ments concerning what disclosure, if any, of estimated present values of op-
tions should be mandated are best made at this stage of the science, not by a 
court under a very general materiality standard, but by an agency with fi-
nance expertise….[such as] the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 336. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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other employment perks to Michael Ovitz.197  The court found 
that the facts alleged, if true, “belie any assertion” that Disney’s 
directors “exercised any business judgment or made any good 
faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed to Disney 
and its shareholders.”198  In particular, the court pointed to the 
plaintiff’s allegations that the board and the compensation 
committee both spent less than an hour reviewing Ovitz’s quali-
fications to serve as president of Disney, that neither the board 
nor the compensation committee reviewed the actual employ-
ment agreement or salary and severance provisions therein, 
and that no expert was hired to evaluate the terms of Ovitz’s 
employment package.199  While this decision may signal the be-
ginning of more litigation in this area, such a conclusion is 
merely speculative at this point.200 
C.  The Law Regarding Setting Executive Compensation in the 
U.K. 
According to the DTI, compensation of U.K. executives should 
be linked to performance.201  Article 82 allows directors “such 
remuneration as the company may by ordinary resolution de-
termine.”202  Moreover, Article 84 provides that directors may 
appoint a managing director or other executive officer and re-
munerate such person as they see fit.203  Generally speaking, a 
public company’s articles of association will empower the board 
to set executive remuneration.204  Since the early 1990s, most 
publicly traded U.K. companies have established remuneration 
committees, pursuant to the disclosure-oriented guidance out-
  
 197. See generally In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 
275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 198. Id. at 287. 
 199. Id.  
 200. For a general discussion of the recent success of shareholder litigation 
in the area of corporate governance, see John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, 89 
A.B.A. J, 38, 38 (2003). See also Gretchen Morgensen, Shareholders Win in 
Effort to Alter Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at C1 (discussing corporations 
settling lawsuits with shareholders by agreeing to change offensive corporate 
governance practices). 
 201. See generally REWARDS FOR FAILURE, supra note 98. 
 202. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, art. 82. 
 203. Id. art. 84. 
 204. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 286–87. 
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lined in the Combined Code.205  The Combined Code suggests 
that such committees be composed “exclusively” of non-
executive directors free from managerial influence.206   
The Combined Code gives guidance on other remuneration-
related issues.  For example, the Code suggests that the level of 
remuneration should only be sufficient to retain directors with 
the competence to run the company, but not higher, and should 
be structured to link compensation awards to performance.207  
The Code also suggests that grants under option and other in-
centive plans be parceled out over time, rather than awarded in 
one large block.208  The Combined Code also addresses the ap-
propriate composition of remuneration.  It suggests that annual 
bonuses and long term incentive schemes be supplemental to a 
director’s salary and that any such deferred remuneration or 
options not be exercised for at least three years.209  A one-year 
limit on service contracts, especially for newly recruited direc-
tors, is also recommended.210  By suggesting that directors re-
main uninvolved in setting his or her own compensation, the 
Code maintains its focus on independent and transparent re-
muneration-setting procedures.211  In addition, director perform-
ance should be factored into bonuses212 and criteria such as the 
company’s status and success in relation to other similarly-
situated companies should factor into incentive schemes.213  Dis-
closure is another keystone of the Combined Code.  In its an-
nual report, the Code suggests that companies disclose the 
membership of the remuneration committee,214 the remunera-
tion policy,215 and details of each individual director’s remunera-
tion package (and reasons for such remuneration).216  The Code 
also recommends that shareholders have a vote at the AGM to 
  
 205. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, paras. B.2.1 (June 1998). 
 206. Id. at para. B.2.1. 
 207. Id. at para. B.1. 
 208. Id. at schedule A, para. 4. 
 209. Id. at schedule A, paras. 1–2. 
 210. Id. at paras. B.1.7–1.8. 
 211. Id. at para. B.2. 
 212. Id. at schedule A, paras. 1–2. 
 213. Id. at schedule A, para. 4. 
 214. Id. at para. B.2.3. 
 215. Id. at paras. B.3.1–3.2. 
 216. Id. at schedule B, paras. 1–3. 
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approve the board’s annual remuneration report217 and that 
shareholders vote to approve any new long term incentive 
schemes.218  
Unfortunately, a large portion of listed companies do not 
comply with the Code and, indeed, have at least one senior ex-
ecutive on the remuneration committee.219  Indeed, a recent 
study by the Pensions Investment Research Consultants sug-
gests that less than 40% of the average remuneration commit-
tees in the U.K. is comprised of fully independent directors.220  
Interestingly enough, even one member of the renumeration 
committee of the London Stock Exchange’s (a publicly listed 
company) is not independent.221  However, even if such commit-
tees were truly “independent” bias would remain an issue.  This 
is because “[i]n most listed companies, a nominating committee 
will work together with the chairman of the board to select the 
individuals who ultimately serve as non-executive directors.”222  
These individuals “have been chosen on the basis that they ‘fit-
in’ with the company, in the sense that they identify with its 
goals and are compatible with the management team.”223  Exac-
erbating this potential bias is the fact that CEOs often attend 
such meetings.  The PIRC studied compliance with the Com-
bined Code in 1999 (the year it first became effective) and de-
termined that director’s pay was one area where compliance 
was poor.224  With regard to one-year contracts for executives, 
  
 217. Id. at para. B.3.5 & schedule A, para.3. 
 218. Id. at paras. B.2.4, B.3.2, B.3.5. 
 219. See PENSIONS INVESTMENT RESEARCH CONSULTANTS, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ANNUAL REVIEW (2002).  See also Press Release, PIRC, Boards 
Dominated By Executives And Connected Directors (Dec. 12, 2002) (“After 
four years of operation, 34% of companies state that they fully comply with 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance.”  More than 75% of company 
boards in the UK are controlled by executives and no-executives who are not 
independent.) 
 220. See PENSIONS INVESTMENT RESEARCH CONSULTANTS, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ANNUAL REVIEW (2002), supra note 219.  See also Press Release, 
Boards Dominated By Executives And Connected Directors, supra note 219. 
 221. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2002). 
 222. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 285. 
 223. Id. at 285. 
 224. See PIRC DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.pirc.co.uk/docind.htm.  See 
also PIRC Press Release, Compliance with Combined Code Worst on Direc-
tors’ Pay Issues (Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.pirc.uk/pr20dec.htm.  
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voting on remuneration reports, and fully independent remu-
neration committees, the PIRC found that only 51% of compa-
nies had one year contracts for executive directors, only 27% of 
companies disclosed that their board had considered voting on 
remuneration committee reports at their annual meeting, and 
approximately 77% of companies had a wholly independent re-
muneration committee.225  In addition, in 1999, the DTI commis-
sioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PWC”) to monitor compliance 
by listed companies with both the Greenbury best practice 
framework and the Combined Code.226  PWC found that only 7 
out of 270 companies (3%) complied with the Greenbury Report 
recommendation that shareholders should have a vote at the 
AGM on remuneration policies.227  PWC also found that in 81 
out of 298 companies (27%), the board chairman was also the 
chair of the remuneration committee; in only 17 of 298 compa-
nies (6%) the majority of the members of the remuneration 
committee were non-independent, non-executive directors.228  
These numbers show poor compliance with the Combined 
Code’s recommendation that “[r]emuneration committees 
should consist exclusively of non-executive directors who are 
independent of management and free from any business or 
other relationship which could materially interfere with the 
exercise of their independent judgment.”229 
Traditionally, U.K. shareholders, specifically institutional 
shareholders, have been hesitatnt to bring derivative lawsuits 
relating to corporate governance issues because of procedural, 
financial, and substantive hurdles.230 In addition, U.K. judges 
have been, and continue to be, reluctant to interfere with execu-
tive compensation.231  Legislation is one area where sharehold-
  
The survey covers 468 companies from the FTSE All Share Index and covers 
the period from Dec. 31, 1998 until June 30, 1999.  Id. 
 225. See PIRC DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT, supra note 224. 
 226. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July 
1999), at annex A (July 1999). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, para. B.2.2 (June 
1998). 
 230. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 131–33. 
 231. See Henderson v. Bank of Australia, LR 40 Ch. D. 170, 181 (1889) (stat-
ing that “[i]t is not for the judge to express any opinion upon such matters as 
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ers can turn for support since executive remuneration in the 
U.K. is somewhat regulated through the Companies Act of 
1985.  For example, under section 311 of the Companies Act, a 
company is prohibited from paying a director remuneration that 
is not subject to income tax.232   
With sparse procedural safeguards for concerned U.K. share-
holders, the issue becomes whether such shareholders have 
their own voice in the remuneration debate.  As Cheffins and 
Thomas observe, “[w]hile the general rule in the U.K. is that 
shareholders do not have a direct say over executive pay, the 
pattern is subject to exceptions.”233  Some sections of the Com-
panies Act give shareholders a voice in setting remuneration.  
For instance, sections 312 through 314 of the Companies Act  of 
1985 provide that a company’s shareholders have the right to 
vote by resolution on employment contracts for executives.  Sec-
tion 312 specifically proscribes that a company first obtain 
shareholders’ approval before it may compensate a director for 
leaving the corporation.234  A company cannot enter into an em-
ployment contract with a director for a term of more than five 
years without the shareholders consent by such resolution.235  
Finally, section 232, a disclosure provision, requires that the 
company disclose, in the notes to the accounts, payments and 
other benefits given to directors.236  In the U.K., shareholders 
can attempt to challenge executive remuneration as constitut-
ing “unfair prejudicial conduct” under section 459 of the Com-
panies Act.237  Although the phrase “unfair prejudicial conduct” 
  
whether the amount [of directors’ remuneration] is too large or too small: the 
directors of the company know a great deal [more] about these matters than [a 
judge] can possibly do”); In Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons, [1994] B.C.C. 475 
(C.A.) (holding that the directors did not violate their fiduciary powers despite 
the fact that the petitioner alleged that the directors had kept the struggling 
company going for the sole purpose of paying themselves compensation). 
 232. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 311. 
 233. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 287. 
 234. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 312. 
 235. Id. §§ 312–14. 
 236. Id. § 232.  In 2002, the U.K. government made it mandatory that 
shareholders give an advisorial vote at the AGM on remuneration packages 
and policies. See infra Part VI. 
 237. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 459.  See also In Re Saul D. Harrison & 
Sons, [1994] B.C.C. 475 (C.A.), (petitioner arguing that directors engaged in 
“unfair prejudicial conduct,” violating section 459, when they paid themselves 
excessive salaries despite the fact that the business was operating at a loss). 
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is not defined in the statute, “various meanings have been at-
tributed to it including from ‘oppression,’ ‘discrimination,’ or 
‘incompetence.’”238 
Another place shareholders can look to for rights is the U.K. 
Listing Authority Listing Rules.  The Listing Rules give share-
holders in a listed company the right to approve executive share 
option schemes and LTIPs.239 
Although some commentators have debated about the share-
holders’ role in setting compensation in the first instance, the 
next section of this Note focuses on how shareholders can chal-
lenge compensation after it has been set.240   
V.  CHALLENGING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION  
There are three basic methods by which a shareholder can 
challenge executive compensation: suing, selling, and voting.241  
As previously mentioned, suing is not usually a viable option for 
shareholders in either the U.S. or the U.K. because courts apply 
a “hands off” approach when it comes to compensation issues, 
preferring to leave such decisions to the corporation.242  In addi-
tion, at least in the U.S., the procedural and economic hurdles 
to bringing a derivative suit for excessive compensation are 
immense.243  Of course, shareholders can always sell their 
shares244 or refuse to invest in companies that they feel overpay 
  
 238. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 312–14. 
 239. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, supra note 49, at para. 
13.13.  For long term incentive plans, see para. 13.13A, defining “long-term 
incentive scheme.”  A listed company that does not obtain shareholder ap-
proval in accordance with these Rules can be censured or delisted.  See also 
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 287. 
 240. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 175, at 187–201. 
 241. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569 
(2001). 
 242. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300 (“In the U.K., this course of 
action has only rarely been pursued.”). 
 243. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 175, at 187–201. 
 244. “Historically, shareholders unhappy with the management of a com-
pany simply ‘vote[d] with their feet’ by selling their shares.”  Viewing Corpo-
rate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens, supra note 175, at 
187–88. 
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their executives.245  However, selling does not necessarily guar-
antee a change in remuneration policy.  This Note focuses on 
challenging executive compensation through shareholder vot-
ing.   
A.  Challenges by Proposal  
There are three main avenues by which shareholders may 
choose to challenge pay practices by proposal: (1) proposals that 
restrict or cap executive pay; (2) proposals that would alter cor-
porate compensation policy so that shareholder approval of pay 
is required; and  (3) proposals that would restrict repricing of 
stock options without first securing shareholder approval.246 
In the U.S., SEC Rule 14a-8 (federal proxy rules) gives 
shareholders the option of putting forth a proposal to be voted 
on at the annual meeting.247  Such proposals are not self-
executing, but rather serve as mere recommendations to the 
board.  However, if the proposal consists of an amendment to 
the corporation’s bylaws, it can become part of the governance 
structure of the corporation.  While this may sound like an idyl-
lic solution for a concerned shareholder, “[b]ylaw amendments, 
especially those dealing with pay issues, are a relatively rare 
phenomenon.”248  In 1998 the SEC recognized this problem249 and 
suggested that “shareholders could use Rule 14a-8 to propose 
bylaw amendments related to pay practices.”250  To be eligible to 
submit a proposal, a shareholder “must have continuously held 
at least $2,000 in market value, or 1% of the company’s securi-
ties entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at 
  
 245. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 25–26 (noting that “[i]f one be-
lieves that excessive pay is pervasive in corporate America, then exiting one 
company would logically mean exiting the market.”). 
 246. Id. at 26–27. 
 247. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998). 
 248. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 26.  See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 
(1998). 
 249. See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Re-
lease No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (1998).  The SEC suggested this same 
practice in 1992.  SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 48,126.  
 250. See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Re-
lease No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (1998).  See also Loewenstein, supra 
note 103, at 25–26. 
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least one year by the date you submit the proposal.”251  Each 
shareholder may submit only one proposal per meeting252 and 
the burden is “on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled 
to exclude the proposal.”253   
Another limitation on shareholder proposals is that there is a 
deadline by which the proposal must be sent to the corporation.  
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8, if the proposal is to be included in the 
proxy materials for the annual meeting, it must be “received at 
the company’s principal executive offices not less than 120 cal-
endar days before the date of the company’s proxy statement 
released to shareholders in connection with the previous year’s 
annual meeting.”254  For proposals that are submitted for special 
meetings (any meeting other than the annual meeting), the ma-
terials must be received by the corporation “a reasonable time 
before the company begins to print and mail its proxy materi-
als.”255  
When a corporation disagrees with a shareholder proposal 
and wishes to exclude the proposal, it will usually advise the 
SEC and attempt to justify its position.256  If the SEC agrees 
with the justification, it will issue a “no-action” letter, advising 
the shareholder not to pursue the proposal further.257  
Regardless of whether shareholder proposals relating to ex-
ecutive pay take the form of non-binding recommendations or 
bylaw amendments, historically such “shareholder proposals in 
  
 251. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (1998).  The shareholder must hold the se-
curities through the date of the meeting. 
 252. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1998).  The proposal cannot exceed 500 words.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (1998). 
 253. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g) (1998).  However, many corporations regularly 
exclude proposals based on the grounds that the proposal is within the ordi-
nary business operations of the company. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) 
(1998). 
 254. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2) (1998). 
 255. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(3) (1998). 
 256. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8(g) (1998) (“The burden is on the company to dem-
onstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.”).  See also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14-8(j)(1)-(2) (1998). 
 257. While shareholders who receive such letters may not submit their pro-
posals to a shareholder vote, they may still pursue the matter in court.  See 
generally Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in 
SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 921, 923–46 (1998). 
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this area generally have not fared well.”258  Indeed, “[i]t is true 
that shareholder proposals on executive compensation issues 
frequently do not succeed.”259  In 1998, the Investor Responsibil-
ity Research Center conducted a study which calculated the 
percentage of votes for shareholder proposals regarding remu-
neration.260  The 1998 survey results demonstrated that, not 
only had voting decreased on shareholder proposals to limit 
compensation, but that the number of proposals had also de-
creased.261  Moreover, the study concluded that “[s]hareholder 
support for executive compensation proposals is not as high as 
with most other types of shareholder proposals.”262  Encourag-
ingly, in 2002 there were “275 shareholder proposals to rein in 
executive pay” — a record number.263  Only two of the proposals, 
however, received majority votes, and regardless, “management 
is free to ignore those mostly nonbinding resolutions and rou-
tinely does.”264 
Similar to Rule 14a-8, section 376 of the Companies Act of 
1985 allows shareholders to submit proposals to be voted on at 
the AGM.  Unlike Rule 14a-8, however, shareholders submit-
ting proposals in the U.K. have more freedom regarding the 
substance of the proposal, mainly because the Companies Act 
takes a hands-off approach to the matter.265   
There are some obstacles for shareholders wishing to utilize 
section 376.  First, unlike Rule 14a-8 of the U.S. federal proxy 
rules, which allows proposals at both annual and special meet-
ings of shareholders, section 376 limits shareholder proposals to 
annual meetings.266  Despite a more flexible approach to the sub-
  
 258. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 26. 
 259. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 175, at 195. 
 260. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, SUMMARY OF 1998 U.S. 
SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS 2 (Feb. 3, 1999). 
 261. See id. 
 262. Id.  It is possible that as a result of the Enron debacle and consequent 
corporate governance reforms (and increased shareholder activism), share-
holder proposals in this area could become more widespread. 
 263. Useem, supra note 9, at 64. 
 264. Id. (Hewlett-Packard and Tyco were the only two companies where 
shareholder proposals regarding executive pay received a majority of votes). 
 265. There is no exception in the Companies Act for “ordinary business op-
erations” as in Rule 14a-8.  See  Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 376–81. 
 266. Id. § 376. 
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stance of shareholder proposals, the U.K. takes a fairly rigid 
approach to the procedural hurdles that a shareholder must 
surpass to succeed in getting a proposal approved.267  As men-
tioned earlier, the cost of circulating a proposal will usually be 
borne by the proposal’s proponent.268  The corporation has the 
right to request that the shareholder pay for the costs of the 
circulation of the resolution and any accompanying statement.269   
Statutory ownership thresholds are another barrier for 
shareholders in the U.K.  In order to make a proposal, an indi-
vidual shareholder or group of shareholders must own at least 
5% of the voting rights of the company.270  Due to the fact that 
few individual shareholders can satisfy this ownership re-
quirement, it is necessary for institutional shareholders, who 
will meet the statutory threshold percentage, to take the lead.271  
Another problem is that such proposals are advisorial only —
even if a shareholder resolution is passed, management is al-
lowed to disregard the resolution.272  
B.  Challenges to Share Option Plans 
In the U.S., some shareholders may have a vote regarding 
stock options paid to executives.  For example, some state laws 
require that shareholders approve stock option plans before 
they can be effectuated.273  However, many states follow the 
Model Business Corporations Act, which does support such 
shareholder voting.274  In fact, Delaware (where many U.S. com-
panies choose to incorporate) follows the Model Business Corpo-
  
 267. Id. § 377. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. § 377(1)(b). 
 270. Id. § 376(2). 
 271. See, e.g., Tony Tassell, Investors Push For Cap on Executive Pay-offs: 
Pension Funds Move to Stem Rising Compensation Tide, NAT. POST, Apr. 18, 
2002, at FP16 (“Leading investor groups are holding talks about stemming the 
rising tide of pay-offs for sacked executives.”). 
 272. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986, 
§ 7. 
 273. In New York, shareholders used to get a vote on such plans under New 
York Business and Corporations Law, § 505(d).  However, this section was 
changed, and shareholders of New York corporations no longer have this 
right.  Under New York, if the stock exchange rules require voting, then New 
York will also.  See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 505(d) (McKinney 2003). 
 274. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 624(a) (2003). 
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rations approach in not allowing shareholder votes regarding 
stock options.275  This is unfortunate since, as noted above, share 
options constitute a substantial percentage of an executive’s pay 
in the U.S.276 and therefore a vote on stock options could increase 
shareholder involvement in setting executive pay.  In addition, 
corporations can benefit from tax deductions if they put execu-
tive compensation plans to a shareholder vote.277   
The NYSE, the NASDAQ Stock Market, and the American 
Stock Exchange all have listing rules that require shareholder 
votes on option plans, with certain exceptions.278   However, “the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ are contemplating 
changing their listing rules to address a loophole which allows 
companies to bypass the shareholder approval process where 
plans include a substantial number of employee participants as 
well as corporate executives.”279  In addition, as discussed in 
Part VI (Recent Developments) infra, the NYSE has just pro-
posed a new rule which would require that shareholders ap-
prove equity-compensation plans within twelve months for 
adoption by the board of directors, as per the Internal Revenue 
Code.280  
In both the U.S. and the U.K. executive compensation may 
potentially be challenged based on breach of fiduciary duties.281  
  
 275. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2003). 
 276. Lambert, supra note 168, at A1. 
 277. A provision of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) provides that a corpo-
ration that pays an executive more than $1 million annually, may receive a 
tax deduction, but only if the amount was paid pursuant to a “performance-
based plan.”  See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (1998).  According the IRC, a plan is 
only considered “performance-based” if it is ratified by shareholders. 
 278. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Corporate Governance Rules, § 
303A,  available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2004); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, Options to 
Officers, Directors, or Key Employees, part 7, §§ 710-713, available at 
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanstockeangeAMEX/AmexCompanyGuide/PA 
RT7/SHAREHOLDERSAPPROVALSS710-713/072F000379.asp (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2004); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, IM-4350-5, Shareholder Ap-
proval for Stock Option Plans or Other Equity Compensation Arrangements, 
available at  http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?Se leNode=4&File 
Name=/nasd/nasd_rules/RulesoftheAssociation_mg.xml#chp_1_4.  
 279. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300. 
 280. See infra Part VI. 
 281. There is some evidence to conclude that shareholder derivative suits 
challenging breach of fiduciary duties are more successful in the U.S. and 
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In derivative litigation in the U.S., the board will typically have 
the burden of proving the fairness of the compensation award if 
it is a self-interested transaction,282 and might therefore have 
incentive, from a litigation perspective, to allow a shareholder 
vote on share option plans. 
C. Challenges at the Annual Meeting  
It has been suggested that shareholders should have a right 
to a non-binding, advisory vote at the annual meeting on execu-
tive compensation matters. 283   Some argue that there is support 
for the fact that management will pay attention to shareholder 
votes on remuneration issues at the annual meeting,284  the 
U.K., recently amended the Companies Act to grant sharehold-
ers this right.285  
Aside from voting directly on compensation, shareholders can 
exercise other voting rights.  For example, shareholders of pub-
licly listed companies in both the U.S. and the U.K. are given 
the right to elect directors.286  Thus, such shareholders may vote 
not to re-elect directors on the remuneration committees whom 
they feel either pay excessive compensation or promulgate com-
pensation policies that are too flexible.287  In the U.K., the Na-
tional Association of Pension Funds (“NAPF”) did just this.288  In 
2001, the NAPF (whose members own almost 25% of the UK 
stock market), reacting to excessive pay given to the Royal 
Bank of Scotland’s executives, “urged shareholders to register a 
protest in this fashion.”289  In the U.S., the SEC has recently 
proposed that shareholders have greater power to nominate and 
  
therefore serve as a better check on excessive executive remuneration. See 
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300–01. 
 282. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 283. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 28; see also Thomas & Martin, The 
Effect of Shareholder Proposals supra note 180, at 1046–48. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See infra Part VI. 
 286. See  DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, supra note 24, §1.01, at 1–2 (1993) (“Most 
central to shareholders’ role then is their power to elect directors, and statutes 
typically refer to that shareholder power expressly.”); CHARKHAM, supra note 
22, at 182; Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 303. 
 287. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 176, at 191. 
 288. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 289. 
 289. Id. 
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appoint directors.290  At the annual meeting, U.K. shareholders 
are given a vote on the company’s accounts.291  Shareholders that 
choose to vote against the accounts are making a statement — 
that they object to the corporation’s pay policies.292   
Unfortunately, neither voting against the re-election of direc-
tors nor voting against the company accounts are all that mean-
ingful.  For one, questionable directors may not be up for vote at 
the time the shareholder votes. Also, many shareholders will 
choose not to vote against a remuneration committee director if 
that shareholder feels that the director provides useful skills for 
other aspects of running the corporation.293  Moreover, there is a 
strong argument that many shareholders do not even vote — 
that “shareholders are apathetic and often fail to open their 
proxy materials, much less take the time to complete a proxy 
card and mail it back to the company.”294  Indeed, the most re-
cent figures from a study conducted by Pensions Investment 
Research Consultants suggest that voting turnout, while show-
ing an improvement during 2001-2002,295 did not improve dur-
ing 2002-2003.296 
VI. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS  
There have been recent developments in both the U.S. and 
the U.K. regarding shareholder voting on executive pay.  At the 
  
 290. S.E.C. Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy 
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. 
Parts 239, 249, and 274, Release Nos. 33-8131, 34-46518, IC-25739. 
 291. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986, 
§ 7. 
 292. This is because directors must prepare a remuneration report as part 
of the company’s accounts.  Id. § 3. 
 293. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership 
Lens, supra note 176, at 200. 
 294. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 27. 
 295. See Press Release, PIRC, Growing Voting Opposition at UK Listed 
Companies (Oct. 9, 2002) (finding that average voting levels for FTSE 350 
companies rose from 51% to 55% and for FTSE All Share companies there was 
a rise from 50% to 53%).  The study also found that “[d]irectors’ pay remains 
important but is not the main issue which has attracted dissenting votes dur-
ing the year.”  Id.  Remuneration issues such as excessive share schemes and 
remuneration policies attracted an increasing number of dissenting votes.  Id. 
 296. See Press Release, PIRC, Upward Voting Trend Halted Says PIRC: 
PIRC’s Annual Survey Highlights “Shareholders Continued Failure To Vote 
At U.K. Listed Companies” (Aug. 29, 2003). 
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end of 2002, the U.K. Parliament implemented a new voting 
policy for shareholders at the AGM and the NYSE just amended 
its listing rules to give shareholders a right to vote on equity 
compensation plans297 — both of which should have positive ef-
fects for shareholder voting rights.  In addition, the SEC has 
weighed in with proposals related to important issues in this 
area.298  The U.K. Parliament passed an amendment to the U.K. 
Companies Act, which went into effect on August 1, 2002.299  The 
new amendment requires that shareholders vote at the AGM on 
the directors’ remuneration report.300  Schedule 7A301 of the new 
regulations provides that the directors’ remuneration report 
must contain several disclosures to the voting shareholders.302   
Pursuant to Part 2 of Schedule 7A, the report must contain 
information regarding four areas of compensation.  First, the 
report must disclose “the circumstances surrounding the con-
sideration by the directors of matters pertaining to directors’ 
remuneration.”303  Second, the report must contain “a statement 
of the company’s policy on directors’ remuneration for the fol-
lowing financial year.”304  Third, the report must contain a per-
formance graph “which sets out the total shareholder return of 
the company on the class of equity share capital, if any, which 
caused the company to fall within the definition of ‘quoted com-
pany.’”305 Lastly, the report must include certain information 
regarding each director’s service contract.306  Part 3 of Schedule 
7A sets out other areas of compensation which must be dis-
closed in the remuneration report, including share options, long 
  
 297. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986, 
§ 7; See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A. 
 298. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A; Viewing 
Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens, supra note 
176, at 188–91. 
 299. See generally Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 
2002/1986. 
 300. See id. § 7.  The new shareholder voting requirement has been inserted 
as § 241A of the Companies Act. 
 301. Schedule 7A is now inserted after the already existing Schedule 7 of 
the Companies Act.  Id. § 9. 
 302. Id. at sched. 7A. 
 303. See id. at “Explanatory Note.” 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
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term incentive plans, pensions, and compensation and excess 
retirement benefits of each director.307   
Although much of this disclosure is already required by the 
SEC in the U.S.,308 the mandatory shareholder vote at the AGM 
is not required in the U.S.309  Despite the fact that the new U.K. 
shareholder vote is only advisory, it seems as though, at the 
very least, shareholders now have an opportunity to voice their 
opinion.  In fact, the new legislation basically codifies the sug-
gestions from the voluntary codes.310  Indeed, the new voting 
amendment, albeit merely advisory, is preferable to the former 
voluntary scheme.  Under the voluntary scheme, whereby com-
panies had the option of putting the remuneration packages up 
for shareholder vote, few companies allowed such votes.311 
However, the U.S. is not standing idly by with regard to ex-
cessive executive compensation.  On June 30, 2003, the SEC 
approved a proposal by the NYSE which requires that share-
holders approve executive equity-compensation plans.312  The 
text of the new rule, codified in Section 303A(8) of the Ex-
change’s Listed Company Manual, reads as follows: “Sharehold-
ers must be given the opportunity to vote on all equity-
compensation plans and material revisions thereto, with limited 
exceptions.”313  The Exchange commented that such equity-
compensation plans (which would include plans under which 
directors pay less than fair market value for shares and which 
are not available to shareholders generally), “can help align 
shareholder and management interests.”314  In addition, the Ex-
  
 307. Id. 
 308. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.402, 229.402 (1999). 
 309. See SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release of 1992, supra 
note 186. 
 310. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 311. In 2001, only 30 of the FTSE 350 companies allowed shareholders a 
vote on executive compensation. See Jill Treanor & Richard Wray, Top Pay 
Vote ‘Not Enough,’ GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2001, available at http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/executivepay/story/0,1204,577504,00.html. 
 312. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A. 
 313. Id. § 303A.08 (Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plans).  
The new rule is also referenced in § 312.03(a) of the Exchange’s Listing Rules 
(Shareholder Approval).  “Equity-compensation plan” is defined broadly to 
include a “compensatory grant of options or other equity securities that is not 
made under a plan.”  Id. 
 314. Id. 
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change noted that part of the purpose of this stockholder ap-
proval was “to provide checks and balances on the potential di-
lution resulting from the process of earmarking shares to be 
used for equity-based awards.”315  The commentary also men-
tions that there are exceptions to the voting requirement —
some plans are exempt from the requirement of shareholder 
approval.316  For example, employment inducement awards are 
not subject to such a vote in the context of mergers and acquisi-
tions.317  The NYSE’s most recent corporate governance stan-
dards, as set forth in the Exchange’s Listing Company Manual, 
Section 303A, and approved by the SEC on November 4, 2003, 
also require that listed companies have a compensation commit-
tee composed entirely of independent directors.318  In addition, 
the compensation committee “must have a written charter that 
addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities…to re-
view and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to 
CEO compensation, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of 
those goals and objectives and…determine and approve the 
CEO’s compensation level based on this evaluation.”319  The 
compensation committee must also have a written charter that 
addresses “an annual performance evaluation of the compensa-
tion committee.”320 
VII.  LOOKING AHEAD — A FOCUS ON SHAREHOLDER RE-
SPONSIBILITIES  
Unfortunately, “[e]nthusiasts for corporate governance do not 
spend much time discussing the shareholders’ responsibilities, 
preferring to concentrate on shareholders’ rights instead.”321  
Perhaps a paradigm shift is necessary to avoid the almost ironic 
inevitability of investors who are passive regarding corporate 
governance, but then become irate when executives pillage the 
very companies the investors own, in which they have little in-
  
 315. Id. It is important to note here that “material revisions” to such plans 
(i.e., a material increase in the number of shares available under the plan) are 
also subject to shareholder vote under this new rule.  Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A.05(a). 
 319. Id. § 303A.05(b)(i)(A). 
 320. Id. § 303A.05(b)(ii).   
 321. Who’s in Charge?, supra note 26, at 21.  
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volvement.  One author has noted that “[s]omewhere along the 
line, managers – who are, after all, just hired hands — started 
behaving as if they owned the place.  And the real owners —
mostly mutual funds and pensions — starting behaving as if 
they didn’t.”322  This same author, somewhat cryptically began 
an article critiquing CEO pay with a quotation from George 
Orwell’s novel “Animal Farm”: “But the pigs were so clever that 
they could think of a way round every difficulty.”323  Is this then, 
the destiny of the regulations regarding executive greed — to be 
one-step behind clever corporations and over-paid executives at 
all times?324  As per the “Law of Unintended Compensation,” 
“any attempt to reduce compensation has the perverse result of 
increasing it.”325  Indeed, one need look no further than the 
scandal involving Richard Grasso to see that regulations cannot 
be the sole impetus to curtail excessive executive pay.326  While 
the NYSE was in the process of proposing new amendments to 
its Listing Manual, which have since become the amended vot-
ing rules on equity compensation plans, the NYSE was paying 
Grasso amounts which made some Wall Street CEOs blush.327 
Perhaps, the answer is not through regulation, as discussed 
previously, but activism from below.  In 2002, the CEO of Cen-
dant Corp., a corporation which has been “revamping its corpo-
rate governance since its 1998 accounting scandal” to include 
such provisions as shareholder approval of executive stock op-
tions, stated: “I think the real impetus [for reform] will not be 
the NYSE, the President, or Congress — it will be the reality of 
  
 322. Useem, supra note 9, at 57, 64. 
 323. Id. at 57. 
 324. Useem also notes in his article:  “Regulation is a spur to innovation, 
and in the pay arena innovation always means “more.”  Id. at 59. 
 325. Id. at 59. (Citing examples from 1989, 1992, and 1993, wherein Con-
gress attempted to place hurdles in the way of rising executive compensation 
only to have the perverse effect of compensation skyrocketing as a result). 
 326. See Thomas, Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, supra 
note 145, at C1; Thomas, A Pay Package That Fat Cats Call Excessive, supra 
note 145, at C1; Craig & Kelly, supra note 145, at C1; Kelly & Craig, supra 
note 148, at C1. 
 327. See Thomas, Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, supra 
note 145, at C1; Thomas, A Pay Package That Fat Cats Call Excessive, supra 
note 145, at C1; Craig & Kelly, supra note 145, at C1; Kelly & Craig, supra 
note 148, at C1. 
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the marketplace.”328  Shifting the focus from government regula-
tion to shareholders, “the ostensible owners of companies,” to 
play a larger role in setting executive pay would “play to capi-
talism’s strength — its flexibility.”329  The SEC has taken just 
this stance by passing a new disclosure-oriented rule, which 
will take effect in the summer of 2004, requiring mutual funds 
to disclose the way they vote their shares.330  Until recently, only 
a handful of mutual funds have disclosed how they voted prox-
ies.331  In the U.K., mutual funds are not obligated to reveal how 
they vote.332  Part of the problem with mutual funds and other 
institutional investors may stem from conflicts of interest —
“banks, insurance companies and mutual funds all want a com-
pany’s banking, insurance or pensions business, so they will 
hesitate to cast the proxy votes of their investment arms 
against the management.”333  Indeed, “some company directors 
are known to meet the institutional shareholders privately to 
make presentations or discuss with them the future of the com-
pany.”334  When this scenario occurs, institutional investors are 
not flexing their “financial muscles” on behalf of those they 
have a fiduciary duty to represent.335  CalPERS, one of Amer-
ica’s largest investment funds, is a role model for other institu-
tional investors.336  CalPERS has been active in “publicly con-
  
 328. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 112.  
 329. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109. 
 330. See SEC Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy 
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. 
Parts 239, 249, and 274 (One of the goals of this proposed rule is “increased 
transparency” to “enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involve-
ment in the governance activities of portfolio companies, which could have a 
dramatic impact on shareholder value.”).  See also Useem, supra note 9, at 64.  
 331. See John Wasik, Speak Loudly — Or Lose Your Big Stick, FIN. TIMES, 
July 24, 2002, at 26 (only eight retail mutual fund groups openly disclose how 
they vote on proxies). 
 332. Polly Toynbee, Starve the Fat Cats, GUARDIAN, May 16, 2003, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,957194,00.html (urging 
that a change in the law which does not require disclosure of mutual fund 
voting in the U.K. is necessary). 
 333. Id.  
 334. Mohammed B. Hemraj, How Shareholders’ Activism Can Refrain Di-
rectors from Highjacking the Company, COMPANY L. 24(11), 345–46 (2003). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Craig & Kelly, Large Investors Call for Grasso to Leave NYSE, supra 
note 145, at C1, C3. 
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fronting companies whose governance it questions,” such as 
Walt Disney Co., eBay Inc., Time Warner, and most recently, 
the NYSE.337 
In addition, private shareholders are often uninterested in 
exercising their ownership privileges, such as voting, because 
they merely “want a financial product.”338  But what worth does 
a right have when it remains unexercised?  For example, the 
U.K. Parliament passed an amendment to the U.K. Companies 
Act, which went into effect on August 1, 2002, requiring that 
shareholders vote at the AGM on the directors’ remuneration 
report.339  Yet, in just over one year since its inception, institu-
tional shareholders have only voted against one existing pay 
package — at GlaxoSmithKline.340  At the very least, sharehold-
ers should take advantage of their right to vote in order to em-
barrass executives.  Indeed, in the U.S., embarrassed executives 
have returned at least a portion of their astronomical pay.  For 
example, in 2002, the CEO of E*Trade Group, Inc., Christos M. 
Cotsakos “returned $21 million in pay after shareholder anger 
over his $80 million pay package boiled over.”341  In July 2002, 
the CEO of Dollar General Corp., Cal Turner, Jr., returned $6.8 
million which “he received as the result of financial results that 
were later restated.”342  A spokesperson for the board of the 
NYSE recently stated that it plans to recommend that federal 
and state regulators pursue legal action against Richard 
  
 337. Id. 
 338. Toynbee, supra note 332.  
 339. See generally Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 
2002/1986. The shareholder voting requirement has been inserted as § 241A 
of the Companies Act.  Id. § 7. 
 340. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109.  Shareholders voted down a finan-
cial package that would have given chief executive Jean-Pierre Garnier £22 
million for leaving the company before his contract had expired, despite a 
significant fall in the company’s share price.  See DTI Consults Over Compen-
sation for Termination of Directors’ Contracts, COMPANY L. 24(9), 271–72 
(2003).  For more information, see also Glaxo Bows to Pressure over Executive 
Pay, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2003, available at (discussing the revised pay policy 
put forth by Glaxo seven months after its pay package was voted down at the 
AGM). 
 341. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 108.  For more information on Cotsakos’ com-
pensation packages from E*Trade, see Troy Wolverton, E*Trade Pays Exec the 
Big Bucks, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1017-895 
842.html. 
 342. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 108–09. 
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Grasso, the former chairman of the NYSE, unless he agrees to 
return a substantial portion of his pay.343 
The SEC also recently proposed “an increase in the power of 
shareholders to nominate and appoint directors.”344  In effect, 
this would allow shareholders to break through the “pay-for-
attendance” model of corporate leadership and put a stop to the 
“you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours” phenomenon of execu-
tive remuneration.345  Such a proposal would be especially im-
portant in the U.K. where the reality is that “the non-executive 
directors in an audit committee are appointed by the executive 
directors who fix their salary.”346  In addition, it is a model for 
the U.K. in the sense that the proposal shows a burden shift, 
albeit a small one, towards placing the responsibility for con-
trolling corporate governance in the hands of the shareholder-
owners.347  The U.K. government has not yet focused on the 
shareholder’s responsibility.  For example, in its 1999 Consulta-
tive Document, the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry 
looked principally at the activities of U.K. companies, their re-
muneration committees, and their accountability to sharehold-
ers.348  Moreover, despite the 2002 Amendment to the Compa-
nies Law, which gave shareholders the right to vote at the AGM 
on executive pay packages, GlaxoSmithKline is the sole exam-
ple of shareholders taking advantage of the new amendment.349  
  
 343. Landon Thomas, Jr., Exchange Said to Want Move on Grasso Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at C1 (“John S. Reed, the interim chairman of the stock 
exchange, has said that he expects Mr. Grasso to return as much as $150 mil-
lion of his compensation.”). 
 344. SEC Proposal Rule, supra note 244.  See also Where’s the Stick?, supra 
note 109. 
 345. Hemraj, supra note 334, at 345–46.  See also Fat Cats Feeding, supra 
note 10, at 66 (“The ‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’ atmosphere of 
company boardrooms has been recognized for decades.”). 
 346. Id.  See also Press Release, Boards Dominated By Executives And Con-
nected Directors, supra note 219. (“Over 75% of UK company boards are 
dominated by executives and non-executives who are not independent, accord-
ing to PIRC’s Annual Review of Corporate Governance published today.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Toynbee, supra note 332. 
 348. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July 
1999), supra note 90. 
 349. Heather Timmons, Glaxo Shareholders Revolt Against Pay Plan for 
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at W1 (noting that the pay package was 
voted against “by a slim margin of 50.72 percent to 49.28 percent”). Two large 
institutional investors who voted against the proposal included Isis Asset 
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Increased regulation regarding exorbitant pay is only the first 
step toward curbing it.  The next step is to place responsibility 
in the laps of shareholders to be instrumental in ensuring that 
such regulations succeed.  Thus some of the focus of the U.S. 
and the U.K. should be shifted toward the responsibility of the 
shareholder.  
In the end, it is evident that “a combination of a bear market, 
some muted shareholder activism, and negative media commen-
tary difficult to dismiss as mere Schadenfreude, [are necessary] 
to effect change at the top.”350  Then, in a bull market, will ex-
ecutive compensation be a moot issue?  There is a strong argu-
ment that in times of financial stability, apathy toward exces-
sive compensation will increase.  Some commentators are hope-
ful that change is afoot and that the balance in power between 
executives and investors is changing.351  For instance, Carol 
Bowie, director of governance research services at the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center in Washington was optimistic 
due to the success of recent shareholder lawsuits: “The share-
holder-management relationship is going through a sea change, 
with shareholders asserting their prerogative as owners of the 
company.  We went through a long period where shareholders 
didn’t interfere with management.  These lawsuits are not just 
to recoup money anymore — they involve forcing companies to 
change their practices.”352 
At least one thing is clear, however, “[i]ncome inequality in 
society has damaging effects.  It reduces overall levels of well-
being, creates a well-spring of resentment and helps trigger an-
tisocial behaviors and outcomes.”353  In addition, a large pay dif-
ferential between executives and lower-level employees is “bad 
for the long-term performance of a company because it breaches 
the trust between top management and the people who work for 
  
Management, which manages £58.8 billion in assets ($95.4 billion) and Cali-
fornia Public Employees’ Retirement System (known as CalPERS), one of the 
world’s largest investors. Id. 
 350. Isles, supra note 128. 
 351. See generally Gibeaut, supra note 200; Morgensen, Shareholders Win in 
Effort to Alter Pay, supra note 200, at C1, C10. 
 352. Morgensen, Shareholders Win in Effort to Alter Pay, supra note 200, at 
C10.  
 353. Isles, supra note 128.  
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them.”354  If “[o]rganizations are microcosms of wider society”355 it 
will be necessary to continue compensation reforms even in a 
bull market and during times of increased profitability.  An-
other thing is also clear – increased regulations are the first 
step in equalizing the playing field.  The next step is for share-
holders to exercise their ownership status and get in the game. 
In both the U.S. and the U.K. it seems as though there is an 
obvious inconsistency between “the outrage expressed in the 
popular press and the lack of shareholder voice.”356  This can be 
attributed to shareholder apathy or a penchant for simply sell-
ing one’s shares instead of fighting to substantiate change.  In 
addition, it is possible that the “free market system” for execu-
tives just does not work all that well.357  Most people are familiar 
with the age-old saying: “to the victor, go the spoils.”358  By ap-
plying this tenet to the present day pay controversies, it is pos-
sible to reach the conclusion that perhaps, performance aside, 
executives have earned a right to substantial compensation by  
the nature of simply getting to be an executive.  Perhaps this 
way of thinking has remained ingrained in our corporate gov-
ernance models — though recent developments show a shift 
away from such shareholder apathy.  Clearly, the governments 
and regulating agencies in the U.S. and the U.K. are making 
strides toward fixing the problem of astronomical executive pay.   
  
 354. Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, supra 
note 108, at  section 3, at 1.   
 355. Isles, supra note 128. 
 356. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 28. 
 357. See generally Bosses for Sale, supra note 121, at 57 (noting that the 
market for executives is secretive, restricted, bad at price-settings and gener-
ally run by the head hunter firms). 
 358. Bartlett’s Quotations attributes this quote to William L. Marcy (1786-
1857) during a speech in the United States Senate in January, 1832 (“They 
see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victors belong the spoils of the en-
emy.”).  See JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 419 (17th ed., 
Justin Kaplan ed. 2002). 
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Yet, until shareholders speak with one, loud, unified voice, pay 
will continue to spiral upward, despite increased government 
regulation.  Institutional investors, generally the largest and 
most powerful owners of corporations in the U.S. and the U.K., 
have begun to flex their muscles and demand that executives 
perform in accordance with how they are paid.  However, at 
least for now, it is still good to be the king. 
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